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The large literature on price dispersion has identified search costs as a primary explanation for the ubiquitous failure of the law of one price. While many expected the Internet to reduce search costs and consequently price dispersion, empirical work has found that price dispersion continues to be widespread even as commerce has shifted online (see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2006 for a survey of the literature). Adding to this evidence, Malmendier and Lee (2011) (henceforth "M&L") found that auction ending prices on eBay often exceed eBay's fixedprice Buy-It-Now ("BIN") prices. M&L examined 167 auctions for the Cashflow 101 board game and 1,931 auctions for a cross section of products such as books and consumer electronics.
In 42 percent of the Cashflow 101 auctions, the ending price exceeded the lowest contemporaneous BIN price, and the mean auction ending price was $0.28 above the mean low BIN price. Showing generalizability, the authors report that in 48 percent of the cross-section auctions, the ending price exceeded the low BIN price, and the mean auction ending price was 10 percent above the mean low BIN price.
These results stand out within the price-dispersion literature because of the prediction in M&L that auction ending prices exceeding the low BIN price in expectation is "inconsistent with rational behavior" (p. 749), and that "without allowing for nonstandard preferences or beliefs, we are not able to explain the observed overbidding" (p. 769). The authors conclude that "the strongest direct evidence points to limited attention" (p. 751), whereby "inattentive bidders overlook the fixed price even though it is available on the same webpage" (p. 756).
2 As in M&L, I use the term "overbidding" for when the auction price exceeds the low BIN price.
A key condition for identifying limited attention in M&L and elsewhere is that the relevant information is sufficiently available to buyers that a standard explanation for ignoring this information is improbable. M&L argue that eBay provides just such a setting: "The fixed prices, so-called buy-it-now prices, are shown together with the auction listings in the results of any Cashflow 101 search on eBay, and users can purchase the game at the fixed price at any point. Hence, the fixed price provides an upper bound to rational bids under the standard model" 1 eBay uses a modified ascending second-price auction format. Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) and Hasker and Sickles (p. 750) . 3 When buyers face uncertainty over the continuing availability of the BIN, or face costs to switch between listings, then M&L predict that the "expected ending price is still smaller than the fixed price" (p. 750) under standard behavior.
If on the other hand the information -in this case, the low-price BIN -is not sufficiently available, and buyers must incur search costs to discover it, then it may be optimal for buyers not to conduct complete searches. Then overbidding with respect to the BIN, even in expectation and possibly by a significant amount, would not inherently be inconsistent with standard behavior.
It is also worth observing that because search costs represent the time and effort associated with search, they could be considered to include at least some of the cognitive costs of search. Therefore, a limited-attention mechanism that arises from cognitive costs may be isomorphic to search costs, and one could view their distinction as merely semantics. 4 On a deeper level though there is a question about when should incomplete searches be considered as deviations from the standard model rather than simply as manifestations of traditional notions of search costs. For example, given heterogeneity across buyers in the time required to research the availability, features, and prices of all potential sellers of a product due to variations in cognitive ability (e.g., in the time required to read through and weigh the relative merits of a large number of eBay listings), is there a cutoff search time above which the search would be considered nonstandard? Or given heterogeneity in buyer disutility of conducting searches, is there a certain degree of disutility that would be considered nonstandard? This article will not resolve the definition of search costs, and this uncertainty may contribute to the discrepancy in interpreting the overbidding results. However, this uncertainty is only one aspect of interpreting M&L.
3 nonstandard. 5 I also discuss whether search costs in a traditional sense of the term -loosely speaking, the time, effort, or financial costs of search under some optimal search approach -are inherent to eBay such that significant overbidding should be expected under standard behavior.
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The aim is to help the reader discern whether the observed overbidding provides meaningful evidence of limited attention, and cannot be explained without nonstandard behavior, and to suggest the importance of search costs in this Internet market. I examine two data sources: (1) the data in M&L, which I obtained through the American Economic Review data-availability policy; and (2) new eBay data that allows for more precise controls.
One suggestion that items may not be "simultaneously auctioned and sold at a fixed price on the same webpage," and that search costs may be important, is that eBay's search can return a webpages. Of these last 163 listings, 14 were for a new standard version of the game from a U.S.-based seller. These disparities are due to: (1) differences in whether "game" or "101" 5 The identification strategy in M&L includes additional conditions: "Ideally, the fixed price should be stable and continuously present throughout the auction so that the bidder who searches for the item at any time finds the same fixed price. Moreover, there should be multiple staggered fixed-price listings so that it is easy to infer that the option will be continuously available" (p. 758-759).
6 For example, in his seminal article, Stigler (1961) describes what might be considered a traditional notion of search costs: "The cost of search, for a consumer, may be taken as approximately proportional to the number of (identified) sellers approached, for the chief cost is time. This cost need not be equal for all sellers, of course: aside from differences in tastes, time will be more valuable for a person with a larger income." appeared in listing titles, and (2) many incorrect products or incorrect versions of the product appearing in search results. Neither of these approaches is inherently better than the other, and the optimal approach may depend on the buyer's idiosyncratic search costs, the expected number of search results, and so on. But because a broad search typically returns multiple webpages of relevant and irrelevant listings, and a narrow search typically returns an incomplete set of listings, the complete set of relevant listings that the buyer must review to avoid overbidding would typically not appear on the same webpage. This is in contrast to the stated identifying assumption in M&L that the relevant listings appear together on the same webpage.
In addition to the qualitative arguments above, I provide empirical evidence that the auctions and low-price BINs sometimes do not appear together on the same webpage, and that search costs may be consequential. My test is based on the idea that differences in the wording of listing titles may cause different buyers to see different sets of listings. To see this, consider that "new" is the one key word that is common across the many different categories of new products in the M&L cross section. Among these auctions, 19 percent have listing titles that contain the word "new" while the corresponding BIN title does not. In these cases, buyers who include "new" in their search string would find the auction but not the BIN. If this friction is important, then the fraction of auctions that are overbid should be higher when the auction title contains "new" and the BIN title does not, and lower for the reverse. Indeed I find an overbidding rate of 60 percent when the auction contains "new" and the BIN does not, and 36 percent when the BIN contains "new" and the auction does not.
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This test cannot be applied directly to the Cashflow 101 data set, which is the primary data set in M&L, because the Cashflow 101 data set provided by M&L does not contain the auction titles. Therefore, my primary empirical test does not apply directly to the primary results in M&L. However, I discuss why wording differences may be important for this product as well.
I also argue that other results in M&L are consistent with search costs. One is that the overbidding rate is higher among auctions with a larger spatial separation in search results from the BIN. Search costs could generate this result because a larger separation would make it more difficult to find both listings. I also apply my test to a new eBay data set of 552 new movie-DVD auctions. I find significant overbidding here (23 percent of auctions), but a close connection between wording and overbidding as well.
In summary, my reading of the evidence is that the auctions and low-price BINs by visually inspecting all auction and BIN titles. 10, 11 To identify the DVD as new, I use sellers' self-reported item conditions, which they have entered into eBay's pre-specified condition categories (e.g., new, like new) to be selected while composing the auction listing. 12 Table 1 shows the movies, mean auction prices (including shipping fees), and low BIN prices (including shipping fees) for the 552 auctions in my working data set. Table 2 shows additional statistics.
[ The Java query tool was designed to be inclusive in the sense of capturing as many listings as could reasonably be expected to appear in a buyer's search. I searched the title and body description of listings (eBay's default is to search only the listing title) in the "DVD, HD-DVD, and Blu-ray" category for U.S.-based listings. I included no modifier search terms, using the movie name only. For example, I searched for DVDs of the 2005 movie Batman Begins 10 I exclude a small number of auctions with bundled products, with a BIN option that was exercised (a distinct format from a standalone BIN listing), and with a buyer with a "private" identity, which hides bidding activity.
11 eBay has introduced several product-discovery features, including catalog identifiers to show product details and some changes in how search results are organized, but these occurred after the sample periods in M&L and my study. Also, eBay has improved the navigation options for searching and has partially updated its search algorithm, but did not opt-in most buyers until after the sample periods in either study. Search results remain sensitive to search terms, and so it is an open question as to whether these changes have meaningfully reduced search frictions. An archive of changes is provided at http://announcements.ebay.com/ (accessed on June 13, 2012). 12 This method is a small improvement over M&L, which used the presence of words indicating newness in the title and listing body to identify items as new (e.g., "sealed" or "never opened"). These words may not be as precise because, e.g., used items can be repackaged or only some part of an item may never have been opened. using the string "Batman Begins" instead of "Batman Begins movie." As discussed earlier, the wording is important because of the "All words, any order" rule of eBay's search algorithm, which generally requires all terms in the search string to be present in the listing title, exactly as spelled, for the listing to appear in search results. The "All words, any order" rule is not sensitive to case, word order, or singular/plural. Blu-ray" box to narrow the search to movies; then choose the "DVD" box to exclude HD DVD and Blu-ray; then choose the "New" box to exclude used items. The user must then discern if the DVD is full screen or widescreen, a collector's edition, the 1967 movie that is also titled Casino Royale, the seller's reputation, shipping fee, and so on.
algorithm, I expect disparate search results to be the most important factor, but these alternatives represent standard behavior, and the first is also a search friction.
As in M&L, I exclude auctions where the DVD failed to sell. 14 I also add shipping fees to all auction and BIN prices because my aim is to know how often the buyer purchased via an auction when he could have spent less via a BIN, which would naturally reflect the total price paid including shipping fees. One could alternately argue that shipping fees should be excluded because buyers may overlook these fees in their purchase decisions, and hence the test could be conducted assuming full shipping-fee neglect. Hossain and Morgan (2006) , Brown, Hossain, and Morgan (2010) , and Einav et. al. (2013) provide evidence on shipping-fee neglect. Einav et. al.
(2013) examined the largest data set and range of products and found that 20 to 30 percent of the shipping fee is not accounted for by buyers (the other studies find a higher rate for several of the products). In Podwol and Schneider (2014) , 26 to 33 percent of the fee was not accounted for (Online Appendix, Table A4 ). Based on the 20 to 30 percent amount in Einav et. al. (2013) , including fees would distort prices by less than not including fees. I include fees for my calculations in the main text, and show results without shipping fees in the Online Appendix.
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M&L focused on overbidding rates without shipping fees, though also report results with fees.
I consider the word "new," which I expect is the most important modifier word across the many different categories of new products in the M&L cross section. Results are in Table 3 .
When only the auction contains "new," 60 percent of auctions are overbid and the mean auction price is 11.4 percent above the low BIN price. In contrast, when only the BIN contains "new," 37 14 Including non-selling auctions is an alternate approach. This would reduce the overbidding rate since 45 percent of auctions did not sell and would count as non-overbid. M&L discuss this point in Footnote 14. 15 Excluding the fees, the overbidding rate is 47 percent rather than 41, and the difference in the overbidding rate associated with "new" (discussed below) is 19 percentage points rather than 23. The conclusions however are unaffected. Also, the outliers are more pronounced when fees are excluded, which creates additional distortions in examining the outcomes without fees. Tables A3 and A4 in 16 M&L acknowledge that they cannot ensure the permanent availability of the fixed price in the cross section, as they could do for Cashflow 101, and so they rely on the prediction that under standard behavior, the expected auction price is strictly smaller than the fixed price, rather than the auction price for each individual auction being smaller than the fixed price. This is stated on p. 755: "We will also use a second, broader dataset, where we cannot ensure the permanent availability of the same fixed price. There, we will rely on part (b) of Proposition 1' to differentiate rational bidding above the fixed price due to uncertainty from overbidding," which is that "In all PBEs of the (full) game with uncertainty, the expected winning price is strictly smaller than the fixed price."
17 Table 4 also shows there is one influential outlier product, The Secret. This book is by far the most common product (170 of the 1,411 auctions) and also has the highest overbidding rate. Among The Secret auctions, 92 percent are overbid, and the mean auction price is 35 percent above the mean low BIN price. For the other 87 products, the mean auction price per product is 5.3 percent below the mean low BIN price (unweighted by the number of auctions per product). It is not clear why The Secret is such an outlier, but one possibility is that the DVD movie version, audio CD version, and hardcover book version, which are often not distinguishable from the listing titles, were confounded. Excluding The Secret, the overbidding rate for all products together is 35 percent rather than 41 percent, and the mean auction price is 3.2 percent below the mean low BIN price rather than 1.4 percent above the mean low BIN price. This rate of 1.4 percent is below the rate of 4.5 percent reported in M&L because I discovered a significant number of auction-BIN mismatches upon visually inspecting the data. In 150 auctions or 9.6 percent of the sample, and most of the grossly overbid auctions, the compared auction and BIN were for different true that the mean auction price exceeds the fixed price when the data are pooled, this condition, which identifies nonstandard behavior under the assumption of inconsequential search costs, does not hold for most products at the individual level.
[ Note also that at least one of the low-price BINs was listed only in the "Everything Else"
and "Education" item categories, and not in the "Toys & Hobbies" or "Games" categories, while some of the auctions were listed in the latter categories (the categories are displayed in the consumer survey discussed on p. 766, which is available through the American Economic Review data-availability policy). One way for buyers to narrow their search results is to search within an item category, and some may have searched for Cashflow 101 within the "Toys & Hobbies" or "Games" categories, which effectively would have made one or both of the BINs invisible.
M&L (Table 10 ) also reported more overbidding when the auction and BIN had a larger spatial separation in search results. This finding is consistent with search costs, because a larger separation would require more time and effort to identify the listings, especially because eBay displays only a limited number of results per webpage, which may require clicking through to subsequent pages. Finally, M&L reported that overbidding did not decrease with experience, a result that I reproduce. 20 The absence of any learning if buyers are indeed making costly mistakes would represent a departure from the observed learning to avoid mistakes in previous work (e.g., List 2003, Cooper and Fang 2008) . This absence of learning is consistent with frictions, which may apply to users of all experiences.
III. OVERBIDDING AND SEARCH COSTS IN MOVIE-DVD AUCTIONS
I now examine the data set of new movie-DVD auctions that I collected. This new data set allows for better controls, as mentioned below. I limit the sample to new DVDs to avoid the risk of unmeasured differences in item quality among used DVDs. I also exclude the seven percent of auctions that failed to sell. I add shipping fees to auction and BIN prices. Results without shipping fees are similar and are reported in the Online Appendix. I use the lowest-price BIN at the time the winning bid in the auction was placed. 21 To ensure that the compared auctions and BINs are for the same items, I visually inspected all listing titles.
The latter columns in Table 1 show the overbidding rate and difference between the mean auction price and low BIN price. Twenty-three percent of DVD auctions end above the low BIN price, but the mean auction price is 18 percent below the mean low BIN price (p<.01). The mean auction price is also below the mean low BIN price for 22 of the 24 movie versions.
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Despite the lower mean auction price, 23 percent of auctions still end above the low BIN price. Words that appear frequently in new-DVD listing titles are "new," "disc," "special," and "dvd." In 24 percent, 3 percent, 3 percent, and 11 percent of cases, respectively, the auction contains the word and the BIN does not; and in 26 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, and 3 percent of cases, respectively, the BIN contains the word and the auction does not. Figure 1 shows overbidding rates for each of these words, and for all words together,
It is apparent that wording differences are associated with large differences in overbidding rates. For example, the overbidding rate is 35 percent when only the auction contains "new," but 15 percent when only the BIN contains "new" (p<.01).
[
FIGURE 1 GOES ABOUT HERE]
Note that many other words may also generate overbidding, including words that are specific to particular movies. For example, Camp Rock (the movie appearing most frequently in my data) has wording differences for "Jonas" (i.e., Jonas Brothers) and "Disney." For "Jonas,"
56 percent, 25 percent, and 19 percent of auctions are overbid when only the auction, the auction and BIN both or neither, and only the BIN contain the word, respectively. For "Disney," these rates are 38 percent, 24 percent, and 0 percent.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER DISCUSSION
M&L are clear in interpreting the observed overbidding as a rejection of standard behavior, and conclude that "the auction mechanism allows the seller to identify the 'fools' among the bidders" (p. 751) and that the "findings have more general implications about consumer choices. They suggest that consumers might not always choose the lowest-price good, 22 Einav et. al. (2013) examined a wide range of products and found some overbidding, but also that "auction prices are strikingly low compared to equivalent posted prices" (p. 13). The BINs in their study are not necessarily the lowprice BINs, but their approach ensures a close or identical auction-BIN match. In that article, the authors introduced the promising new approach of using sellers' own experiments with auction designs to investigate consumer behavior in Internet markets, which is a primary focus of their article.
even when the good are homogeneous and search costs are low" (p. 777). While M&L do not claim that limited attention is the sole explanation, and are clear that certain frictions may be present (switching costs and uncertainty about the continuing availability of the BIN), their identification strategy is predicated on search costs being inconsequential.
My interpretation of the available evidence is that the rejection of the standard model is premature, and that the observed overbidding is not inconsistent with standard behavior once basic search costs, which fit well within the standard economics canon, are allowed. I do not argue that limited attention is absent -the available evidence does not allow for a clear assessment one way or the other -and limited attention may very well be revealed as important once additional evidence is brought to bear. Nevertheless, if meaningful search costs are present, then the evidence in M&L does not make much progress on the reasons for overbidding beyond the already large literature on price dispersion.
In a companion article, Podwol and Schneider (2014) , I provide evidence that some of the other overbidding results in the auction literature that have been attributed to nonstandard behavior, including auction fever, nonrational herding, quasi-endowment effect, and escalation of commitment, may also have standard explanations. Taking my two studies together, I argue that much of the previous evidence of nonstandard bidder behavior is either weaker than it first appears or may not hold at all. Notes: Shown are statistics for each movie title and version that resulted in sale in the observational data set. "Fraction overbid" is the fraction of auctions with an ending price that exceeds the corresponding lowest-price BIN. "Auction -BIN price ($)" is the difference between the mean auction price and the mean low BIN price. Prices include shipping fees. Notes: "Fraction overbid" and "Fraction overbid 5 percent" are the fraction of auctions that end above the low BIN price, and the fraction of auctions that end over 5 percent above the low BIN price, respectively. "Mean Δ price (percent)" is the mean percentage difference between the auction ending price and the low BIN price across products. "Median Δ price (percent)" is the median percentage difference, which reduces the influence of outliers. Prices include shipping fees. "New" "Disc" "Special" "DVD"
